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There is growing evidence that fiscal consolidation may contribute to
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in the EU New Member States. We extend the analysis to test potential
channels through which non-Keynesian effects may operate. The results
confirm that composition of the consolidation determines the output re-
sponse. Moreover, we find evidence that all types of fiscal consolidations
stimulate private investments, while export acceleration is observed only
when consolidations involve mostly expenditure curtailment. Private con-
sumption reaction to fiscal policy shows signs of nonlinearity - in the case
of minor adjustments Keynesian effects dominate, but they are cancelled
out when sizable consolidations are considered.
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Giavazzi and Pagano in 1990, there has been an ongoing argu-
ment in the economic profession about potential consequences of fiscal consolida-
tions. It seems that the idea of consolidation accelerating rather than hampering
output growth in the short term is less and less controversial. In June 2010,
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank pointed that ’the
idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect.(. . . )I firmly
believe that in the current circumstances, confidence-inspiring policies will fos-
ter and not hamper economic recovery’.1 Nevertheless, the discussion is hardly
over and it concerns both research methodology and the validity of the results,
for example, regarding conditions that are necessary for fiscal adjustment to
result in output acceleration.
As far as methodology is concerned, a key point of any work on the topic
is the decision how to solve the problem of endogeneity between growth and
fiscal deficit. It is clear that, while changes in fiscal deficit may affect GDP
growth, economic conditions are also important determinants of both govern-
ment spending and revenues. Having that in mind, one should look for a proxy
for fiscal stance that is exogenous to GDP growth. We have counted more than
six different approaches widely used in the literature to cope with this prob-
lem. Obviously, the results often differ substantially when different methods
are applied. The debate on the methods used to separate discretionary changes
in fiscal policy attracted some attention in media (which is not very usual for
discussions concerning methodology). In the article ’Cutting Edge’ published in
the Economist of 10th September 2010, authors called the standard techniques
like the CAPB (cyclically adjusted primary balance) to be ’seriously flawed’ re-
ferring to the conclusions of the IMF (2010) work. However, the article was soon
criticized by Alberto Alesina of Harvard University,2 who applied the CAPB in
one of his recent papers (Alesina and Ardagana, 2010). The relevant aspects of
this discussion will be addressed in more detail hereinafter.
Even when using the same or similar methods for identification of fiscal impulses,
researchers come up with different and often contradictory results concerning
the pattern of the relation between output growth and fiscal policy stance in
the short term. This is because of the different datasets (developed versus
emerging economies), different methods of analysis (descriptive statistics versus
econometric studies or DSGE models) and other factors. As far as economet-
ric studies are concerned, other factors mentioned above involve, inter alia, the
selection of control variables allowing to obtain a more detailed picture of con-
ditions necessary for the occurrence non-Keynesian effects.
In this paper we compare a number of different approaches used to separate
non-cyclical changes in fiscal deficit. Then, we estimate a range of panel data
models in order to determine what is the expected response of real GDP growth
1An interview given to La Republica on Wednesday 16 June 2010, conducted by Elena
Polidori
2Complete response of Alberto Alesina to the Economist article can be found on his Harvard
University website
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to discretionary changes in fiscal policy. Having that, we extend our regression
analysis by assessing the channels through which non-Keynesian effects may oc-
cur.
We use data not on developed countries as it is done in most works, but on
the EU New Member States (NMS), that is Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia. Our motivation for selecting these countries was threefold. Firstly,
the European Union membership and the perspective of joining the euro-area
imposed more discipline on authorities with regard to fiscal policy. Hence, last
decade provided us with a substantial number of fiscal consolidation cases in
NMS countries that may represent an important lesson for the future. Sec-
ondly, in 7 out of 10 countries mentioned above a substantial improvement
in cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) in years 2009 and 2010 was ob-
served. Moreover, despite the current adjustments, in most NMS countries fiscal
deficits are still higher than in pre-crisis period and more effort to curtail gov-
ernment expenditure or rise taxes is needed. In such circumstances, the question
which fiscal reforms may be least detrimental to the economic performance in
the short term is of great practical importance. Thirdly, one may find argu-
ments in the literature that countries in transition seems to be especially prone
to experience expansionary fiscal consolidations. Thus, if the non-Keynesian
effects were not observed in such countries, it would be reasonable not to expect
them to occur in more developed economies.
This article differs from most of the existing literature in three respects. First,
we have not encountered any other works on the topic which test the robustness
of econometric analysis by applying different methods to identify fiscal impulses
as we do. Second, one of the methods we use - the underlying fiscal balance -
is still surprisingly unpopular, despite its potential for correcting the biases of
the standard CAPB approach. To our best knowledge, this is the first article
discussing the impact of CAPB correction on the results concerning relation
between fiscal policy and growth. Third, most of the existing papers focus on
developed countries while analyzing the possible non-Keynesian effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, theoretical
explanations of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations are systematized.
In the section three, we review current empirical research devoted to validation
of theoretical channels and conditions for the occurrence of non-Keynesian ef-
fects. In the fourth section we discuss methodological aspects of the research
and describe the results of panel data regressions analysis. We separately trace
the response of output to changes in fiscal policy and the possible channels (pri-
vate consumption, export and private investment)that make up this response.
Section five summarizes the main conclusions.
3
2 A Survey of Existing Theories
In the Keynesian approach, fiscal contraction is said to reduce aggregate de-
mand and, as a result, output. In the simplest case, a given improvement in the
fiscal balance leads to a decline in aggregate demand that may be considerably
larger. The decline consists of: the original reduction in public expenditure (or
in private consumption, if the improvement in fiscal balance is achieved through
tax increases or transfer cuts), plus secondary falls in private consumption, re-
sulting from diminished flow of total income from enterprises to households and
households’ allocation of a fixed percentage of additional income to consump-
tion. One may derive the general definition of non-Keynesian effects from that
of Keynesian ones: an improvement in the fiscal balance is said to lead to a non-
Keynesian effect, if that improvement causes an increase in aggregate demand
and output.
However, this kind of division of the effects of fiscal contraction into Keynesian
and non-Keynesian is imprecise. Using even the simplest textbook Keynesian
model (that is, the Samuelson model), one can easily show that fiscal contrac-
tion may under certain circumstances raise aggregate demand. Since tax and
transfer multipliers are smaller than the public expenditure multiplier, as far as
the modules are concerned, a sufficient condition for an increase in aggregate
demand is to increase taxes or to cut transfers, provided that those measures
are eased by an adequate increase in public expenditure on goods and services.
So it is clear that to assess the effects of fiscal contraction, one needs to know
the mechanisms that have driven them.
Models explaining non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction can be divided
into two groups. This division is presented in Figure 1. The first group at-
tributes the source of non-Keynesian effects to the concerns of private agents
about government’s solvency. According to the models of the second group,
these non- Keynesian effects are caused by positive supply shocks, induced by
fiscal impulses.3
According to the first type of explanation, the strength and sign of the relation
between aggregate demand and fiscal impulses both depend on the expectations
of private agents. In the aftermath of fiscal contraction, households may reach
the conclusion that they have had over-pessimistic expectations as to the course
of public expenditure and cumulated tax burdens (factors which influence the
distribution of income between consumption and savings). In that case, adjust-
ment of these expectations may result in an increase in private expenditure that
more than offsets the direct negative impact of fiscal adjustment on aggregate
demand. The sign of the relationship between aggregate demand and negative
fiscal impulse will be positive, if, in the opinion of households, a reduction in
the budget deficit considerably raises the cumulated flow of disposable income
in their horizon of utility maximization.
The occurrence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction is more likely when
public debt is high and growing. In such circumstances, households are more
3Similar division of channels leading to expansionary effects of fiscal consolidation was
proposed by Alesina (2010)
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likely to expect to be soon burdened with the repayment of a part of the debt
accumulated by previous generations (see, for example, Sutherland, 1995). Be-
sides, when public debt is high and growing, a rise in taxation to a level causing
serious distortions is more and more likely (see, Blanchard, 1990). A sufficiently
large reduction in fiscal deficit would dispel both of these concerns.4
Fiscal impulses may also lead to non-Keynesian effects due to their influence on
interest rates and, thus, on interest rate-sensitive private expenditure - this in-
fluence being stronger than predicted in the standard Keynesian approach (with
regard to the latter one see, for example, Hicks, 1937). With public debt, there is
always the risk that the government will attempt to decrease its real value with
higher inflation, or that the government will become insolvent or illiquid. That
risk is reflected in interest rate premiums. When the state of public finances
raises concerns of economic agents, reduction of fiscal deficit, by substantially
decreasing the previously high currency and country risk premium, may crowd
in private expenditure (which is sensitive to changes in interest rates) much
more strongly than in ’normal’ times (see, for example: Miller, Skidelsky and
Weller, 1990).
Let us now turn to the second type of explanation for non-Keynesian effects.
Fiscal impulses may cause supply shocks which lead to changes in output,in
particular they may have an impact on real wages. This kind of supply shock
spills over into the economy more quickly than other kinds of supply shock as
it is more easily perceived by economic agents.
Generally speaking, the sign of the shock caused by the reduction of fiscal deficit
cannot be unambiguously determined. It depends on the way fiscal policy is
tightened. Deficit can be reduced either by cuts in spending or through tax
increases. Reducing expenditure, particularly on wages and salaries, eases wage
pressure in the whole economy, while higher taxes boost the pressure. Wage ex-
penditure constitutes the main cost of enterprises en masse. A fall in real wage
dynamics increases the price competitiveness of businesses on the international
market. The more open the economy, the more important the wage dynamics
for the economic performance of the country in question. Strengthened wage
4 Conversely, an increase in fiscal deficit, by accelerating the pace at which public debt
grows, hastens the moment when fiscal policy must be changed, thus strengthening pessimistic
expectations of households.
The influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand may also depend on the level of public
expenditure to output ratio. If the ratio is low, then the increase of public expenditure is - to
a considerable degree - offset by the decrease of private consumption, because households are
aware that the government is unlikely to cut public expenditure until its financing becomes a
problem, and thus, they consider the increase to be permanent. Each subsequent increase in
government spending leads to an ever weaker decrease of private consumption and, in effect,
a stronger increase in aggregate demand because the higher the level of current expenditure,
the greater the proportion of households thinking that the increase of public expenditure is
temporary. If public expenditure exceeds a certain threshold - and despite this is not reduced
- households cease to believe in the temporary nature of its previous increase. As the value of
the cumulated tax burden expected by households goes up sharply, households considerably
reduce their consumption. In effect, the increase of public expenditure is associated with a
decrease of aggregate demand (see, for example Bertola and Drazen, 1993). Thus, the failure
to reduce the budget deficit may, if announced, result in a sharp fall in private consumption,
leading to a decrease in aggregate demand
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discipline may also raise enterprises’ profits, which affect both their capacity
and their propensity to invest.5 Accelerating wage momentum has precisely
opposite effects.
It follows that a reduction in deficit, depending on how it is implemented, could
either boost, or diminish domestic business profitability and domestic business
competitiveness in the international markets. The increase in competitiveness
occurs if the deficit is reduced by curtailing expenditure on wages and salaries,
and the opposite happens if taxes are raised. All this means that, with regard to
the short-term impact of fiscal impulses on output, they should have a compo-
sition exactly opposite to that suggested by the standard Keynesian approach
(see, for example, Alesina, Ardagna, Perotti, Schiantarelli, 1999 or Lane, Per-
otti, 2001).
To sum up: according to the first explanation, non-Keynesian effects should
occur only if a government, facing the spectre of a fiscal crisis, decides to im-
plement credible fiscal consolidation - consolidation strong enough to stop the
growth of public debt. The origin of non-Keynesian effects in this view is the
dispelling of the uncertainty left in the public mind by the government’s previ-
ous policy. Such an explanation can be called quasi-Keynesian, since, on the one
hand, it is close to Keynes’ conviction (1936, chapters 5 and 12) about the role
played by the changing expectations of private agents in causing fluctuations
in aggregate demand, and, on the other hand, those effects are only considered
likely in the case of deep initial fiscal imbalance.
In the second explanation, the occurrence of non-Keynesian effects depends on
the composition of fiscal contraction rather than on the scale of the initial fis-
cal imbalance. The source of non-Keynesian effects is a positive supply shock,
whose nature is exclusively determined by the manner in which current fiscal
policy is tightened - not by the manner in which it was conducted in the past.
However, it should be pointed out that these explanations are not mutually ex-
clusive - various mechanisms described in them seem to be independent of each
other. In that sense, contrary to what is sometimes stated in the literature (see,
for example, Giavazzi, Jappelli, Pagano, 2000), different views are not compet-
ing, but rather complementary.
At the end of this section it is worth noting that non-Keynesian effects of fiscal
contraction may be easily shown using the slightly modified textbook IS-LM
model (see, for example, Silber, 1970; Mankiw and Summers, 1984 or Rzon´ca,
2005,2007), which itself has largely contributed to the widespread view that the
only possible change of output during fiscal consolidation is its decline.
5 A fall in real wage dynamics raises (ceteris paribus) capital remuneration, but has no
impact on depreciation of capital. Thus, the increase in capital remuneration is tantamount
to a rise of rate of return from investment
6
Figure 1: Types of Explanation of Non-Keynesian Effects of Fiscal Contraction
3 Review of empirical studies
The experience of Denmark in 1983-1986 and Ireland in 1987-1989 triggered nu-
merous empirical research on circumstances where a reduction in public spend-
ing or a rise in taxes leads to a growth in output - even in the short term. The
experience of these two countries was thoroughly analysed in the seminal paper
by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). Many more episodes of non-Keynesian effects
of fiscal contraction have since been identified and discussed. Yet, case studies
have usually been treated as a mere starting point for research into those effects.
The next step - analysis of the experience of a wide group of countries - has
been undertaken. At first, this analysis came down to the quoting of descriptive
models which focused on the issue of the persistence of fiscal adjustment (see,
for instance, McDermott and Wescott, 1996). Gradually, as more emphasis was
put on estimating private consumption or investment equations - researchers
were able to quantitatively determine the channels through which fiscal tighten-
ing leads to non-Keynesian effects. In most cases single equations, constructed
on an ad hoc basis, were estimated (see, for example, Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano, 1999), but the multi-equation approach, in the form of the structural
VAR framework, has also been applied (among others in Perotti, 2002). Recent
economic developments in developed economies triggered new wave of research
concerning macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustments.
Several works investigated the effects of fiscal policy in a DSGE framework.
Most of them concentrated on assesing spending/tax multipliers in different
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conditions concerning monetary policy rules (Davig and Leeper, 2009), time-to-
build lag of government investment (Leeper, Walker and Yang, 2009) or limited
access to asset markets for households. Overview of the effects of fiscal stimulus
predicted by DSGE policy models used in international economic organization-
slike IMF, ECB or OECD can be found in Laxton et al. (2010). What is
important, most papers assume that in the long term on average government
deficit must be balanced and any fiscal stimulus must be followed by an ap-
propriate adjustment in the form of spending or distortionary tax change. In
general, in most cases the calculated spending multipliers are higher than one,
however, their exact value may depend on additional assumptions concerning
for example chosen method of debt stabilization (Leeper, Walker and Yang,
2009). Nevertheless, one may have certain doubts about the usefulness of the
above-mentioned DSGE models in veryfing the existence of non-Keynesian ef-
fects. One of the crucial assumptions of these models is the availability of
perfect knowledge about present and future policy rules governing changes in
public expenditure and taxes. As already mentioned, one of the channels for
non-Keynesian effects occurrence is a change in public expectations about pub-
lic debt sustainability, so grasping these effects is impossible in models that
do not even allow for government defaults. A step toward accounting for this
omission was made in Clinton et al. (2010) by introducing an assumption that
the government need time to convince other economic agents that the consoli-
dation program is credible, so they could adjust their expectations (three years
in basic scenario). Prior to that time agents expect that the program will be
abandoned in the following year. The study concludes that budget consolida-
tions are ’long-term gains’ but ’short-term pain’ in terms of their impact on
GDP growth. Nevertheless another conclusion is that credibility of the adjust-
ment is crucial to minimize short-term output losses. Another way to account
for the impact of deficits on the public expectations in DSGE framework is to
expand the model by introducing direct relation between the long term interest
rate and the public debt level (see Carvalho, 2009). In such augmented model,
a fiscal consolidation based on a spending adjustment may prove expansionary,
especially (but not necessarily) if the adjustment coincides with ’a structural
change in the fiscal budget in favor of more productive spending’.
The following conclusions from the empirical studies on non-Keynesian effects
of fiscal contraction may be drawn up:
1. Episodes of fiscal tightening are very often accompanied by an accelera-
tion of output momentum. This acceleration is driven by both private
consumption and investment. However, the growth rate of the latter one
increases much more than that of the former one (see, for example, Alesina,
Perotti and Tavares, 1998 or Broadbent and Daly, 2010). The acceleration
of investment momentum is preceded by an increase in the share of capital
remuneration in output (see Alesina and Ardagna, 1998).
2. One of the key channels through which non-Keynesian effects may occur
is the increase (drop) in interest rates following fiscal expansion (contrac-
tion). Recent work of Baldacci and Kumar (2010) confirms that long-term
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bond yields are to significant extent determined by changes in fiscal policy
stance. The relation is robust, nonlinear and dependent on initial condi-
tions (like public debt level) or global factors (like investors risk aversion or
global bond supply). These results are generally consistent with previous
works like Engen and Hubbard (2004) or Laubach (2009).
3. Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction are more plausible in open
economies rather than in closed ones (see, for example Hemming, Mahfouz
and Schimmelpfennig, 2002).
4. Non-Keynesian effects occur mainly when the external economic condi-
tions are favorable (McDermott and Wescott, 1996). However, an unfa-
vorable domestic economic situation in the period preceding fiscal adjust-
ment, does not present an obstacle (Alesina and Perotti, 1996) and may
even favour the occurrence of these effects (Segura-Ubiergo, Simone and
Gupta, 2006). Consolidations started under bleak domestic and external
circumstances are more often based on expenditure reduction and more
persistent than adjustments occurring in favorable conditions (see Von
Hagen and Strauch, 2001)
5. It follows from most studies that non-Keynesian effects occur more often
when fiscal adjustment is lasting (see, for example Alesina and Perotti,
1996) and large (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996). Some of those studies point
out that probability of the non Keynesian effects occurrence is greater
when public debt is high (Bhattacharya, 1999) or fast growing (see, for
example, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000), rather than low and, at
most, slowly growing.
6. Fiscal adjustments are more lasting and lead more often to non-Keynesian
effects if they are caused by curtailment of expenditure rather than by tax
increases (see, for example, Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998 or Tsibouris
et al., 2006). Some works show an opposite relationship, but they mainly
concern the response of private consumption to negative fiscal impulses
(see, for instance, Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 1999).
7. Recents works (IMF, 2010 or Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo, 2009) sug-
gest that in periods when the zero-interest rate is binding fiscal consoli-
dations tend to have contractionary effects on output. This observation
proves that real interest rate behavior plays an important role in the mech-
anism of non-Keynesian effects.
8. The manner of fiscal policy tightening is of far greater importance in terms
of its consequences than the scale of deficit reduction. Among expansion-
ary and successful (in terms of debt reduction) adjustments, those that
focus on transfers to households are particularly frequent (see, for example,
Alesina and Ardagana, 2010). However as far as only consumption (and
thus saving) channel for non-Keynesian effects occurrence is concerned,
size of the adjustment plays a crucial role (Giavazzi et al., 2005).
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9. Most of empirical studies base on data samples from developed countries.
However, countries in transition seem to be especially prone to experi-
ence expansionary fiscal consolidations, because ofhigh level of uncertainty
about their future fiscal position (Mulas-Granados et al. 2002). Coun-
tries of this group often experienced a substantial duress at debt levels
that would be perceived as manageable in more developed economies (see,
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). At the same time, countries that
have managed to credibly stabilize public debt and have achieved fiscal
sustainability are less likely to get large benefits in terms of growth by pur-
suing additional fiscal adjustment (Segura-Ubiergo, Simone and Gupta,
2006). Several descriptive analyses of fiscal policy in Central European
countries confirm that the composition and the size of the adjustment
strongly affect the probability that consolidation proves expansionary (for
example Horva´th et al., 2006 or Neicheva, 2007). Finally, the argument
that expenditure-based consolidations are more successful in debt reduc-
tion seems to hold as far as Central European countries are concerned
(see, for instance, Alfonso, Nickel and Rother, 2005).
In closing this section it should be emphasized that none of the aforementioned
studies considers the acceleration in output as a result of fiscal tightening to
be certain. In the literature, the view still prevails that the Keynesian reaction
of output to budget deficit reduction is more plausible than the non-Keynesian
one. But then that response is at most of modest scale. Most empirical studies
on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating aggregate demand show that
the tax multiplier hardly exceeds one half and that of public expenditure hardly
exceeds one (see, for example, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Hall, 2009;Barro
and Redlick, 2009 or Ramey, 2011).
4 Econometric analysis
In this section we used panel data estimation techniques to verify whether fis-
cal policies in the New Member States in 1995-2010 resulted in non-Keynesian
effects. First, we briefly describe the methods we used to obtain measures of
discretionary fiscal policy. Then, we present the data, the specification of the
equations and estimation techniques used. Lastly, we provide results of the
estimation.
4.1 Fiscal impulses
To evaluate the effects of fiscal policy on economic performance, discretionary
changes in this policy should be separated from changes induced by cyclical fluc-
tuations in macroeconomic variables. There are several ways of achieving that,
although the most popular is the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB).
The CAPB is used as the main indicator of the fiscal policy stance by interna-
tional institutions like the OECD and the European Commission. The CAPB
estimation process involves three steps:
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1. The first step is to calculate changes in the output gap - percentage devia-
tion of the actual GDP from its potential or trend. The potential (trend)
is, of course, unobservable so one needs additional assumptions about
production process. One way is to simply treat the observed GDP series
with one of commonly used filters (like Hodrick-Prescott) to distinguish its
deviations from the trend. Second way is to assume that production pro-
cess may be described by some functional form (like Cobb-Douglass) and
calculate derivations of production factors volumes from their potential
levels. Commonly, the TFP (Total Factor Productivity) is decomposed
into potential and cyclical part using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, capital
is assumed to stay at the potential constantly in time and labor deviations
are calculated using the NAWRU concept (Non-Accelerating Wage Rate
of Unemployment).
2. The next step is to estimate elasticities of different expenditure and rev-
enues types with respect to economic fluctuations. The expenditure sen-
sitivity is usually restricted only to outlays on unemployment benefits as
they are the only category that is assumed to move automatically along
with the output gap. The revenue sensitivity is often a weighted average
of four revenue type elasticities (personal income taxes, corporate taxes,
social contributions and indirect taxes) with weights set according to the
relative share of each category in the total government revenue.
3. Finally, one needs to apply changes in the output gap from the first step
to marginal rate of change of different taxes and government expenditure
measures with respect to GDP obtained in the second step. The result of
this operation is a cyclical component of the budget balance. By subtract-
ing it from the observed values of the budget balance one gets a structural
part, whose changes should reflect the government policy actions.
In this paper we decided to apply the CAPB with the output gap calculated
using the production function (PF) approach as it is much better anchored in
the economic theory. The PF approach constitutes a reference method used by
the European Commission to asses the stability and convergence program, while
the approach based on the H-P filter serves as a backup method. Nevertheless,
this choice reduces the number of observations as output gap data according to
the production function method are not always available, in contrast to GDP
deviations from the H-P trend which are easily obtainable for all cases.
The CAPB method is conceptually simple and allows to account for the differ-
ences in country government revenue and expenditure structure in a consistent
way, giving comparable results. Yet, this method should be used with certain
reservations, as noticed by the IMF (2010). IMF study argues that this strategy
biases the analysis toward downplaying contractionary effects [of fiscal consol-
idation] and overstating expansionary ones’. Firstly, in the years preceded by
one-off government transfers the CAPB shows significant improvement in bal-
ance, what is clearly unfounded. These one-off transfers may include, for in-
stance, sales of mobile telecom licenses or subsidies to an insolvent government
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enterprise. Secondly, the CAPB may be biased toward detecting consolidations
in the peak of business cycle due to changes in the asset value affecting the bud-
get balance and recorded in the CAPB structural part.6 The IMF gives certain
examples of such misspecification cases. Problems mentioned in the IMF study
already identified a few years before, for example, in Girouard and Andre´ (2005)
and significant progress has been made to improve CAPB estimates.
In Joumard et al. (2008) the authors come up with a concept of underlying fiscal
balance - the CAPB corrected by changes in net capital transfers that stands
for a proxy of the government one-off transfers. The idea is that, by definition,
one-off transfers are events with direct effects restricted to short period. Thus,
such one-offs are an instantaneous deviation of a variable from its normal path,
which may be captured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Net capital transfers
were chosen as a variable that reflects one-off government transactions and is
easily accessible. Such adjusted underlying balance performs significantly bet-
ter in cases pointed by the IMF to prove inaccuracy of the CAPB to separate
one-offs from fiscal policy changes, for example Germany (1996), Japan (1999
and 2006). Moreover, the correction is easy to apply and it ensures consistency
in one-off identification across time and countries. Of course, the method has
some limitations. It does not identify one-offs that are not included in capital
transfers and rely on the Hodrick-Prescott filter that raises end-of-sample prob-
lem, namely, the identified trend depends heavily on net transfers data at the
ends of the sample period. It also should be mentioned that capital transfers
may include volatile components other than one-offs and these components will
also be excluded from the underlying balance. However this may not be prob-
lematic, as these volatile factors are rarely structural in nature. Another step
to improve CAPB reliability would be to adjust it to deficit changes driven by
asset prices movements, the effect not considered in CAPB estimates provided
by the OECD or the EC. Tagkalakis (2009) finds that a pick up in asset prices
increases the likelihood of fiscal consolidation defined as an improvement in the
CAPB by at least 1.5 percent of GDP.Yet, this problem has not been addressed
so far. It is worth noting that even if corrected for one-offs and asset prices
changes, the CAPB may fail to provide accurate estimate of fiscal stance in the
periods of aggregate shocks or recession when values of certain taxes or expen-
diture elasticities may differ from these estimated for ’normal’ times.
Another approach to separate structural balance changes, which represents a
philosophy different from the methods presented above, is a method based on a
simplified growth accounting proposed by von Hagen (2002). This approach is
one of the easiest to apply. It assumes that change in the primary fiscal balance
to GDP ratio (∆st) can be decomposed into three components: change due to
economic growth (∆sGt ), change due to ’neutral’ fiscal policy (∆s
N
t ) and, finally,
change that can be attributed to government active policy (∆spt ). The author
defines ’neutral’ policy as one that keeps tax rate and government spending
ratio to trend GDP constant. The change due to economic growth is a change
that would occur if the government allowed expenditure to vary with difference
6 An observation made also by Morris and Schuknecht (2007)
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between GDP growth rate and its trend. According to the author’s equations
specification this gives us a surprisingly simple formula for discretionary change
in fiscal stance (GDP means real product):
spt = ∆st − st−1
∆GDPt
GDPt−1
Thus, a positive number means fiscal consolidation and a negative one - fiscal
expansion. On the one hand, this approach is easy to apply and does not re-
quire estimates of government spending or tax elasticities and potential GDP.
This feature is very important if one needs to analyze countries that undergone
economic transition and have not completed enough business cycles to pro-
vide reliable estimates of abovementioned elasticities. On the other hand, this
method assumes that aggregate government expenditures and revenues react to
business cycle fluctuations in the same way. This may be a serious oversimpli-
fication if one notices that volatility of aggregate government expenditures and
revenues depends on their composition. There are countries in which gross of
public expenditure is rigid (for example, spending on education or public pen-
sions), while other countries are characterized by a high share of more flexible
government spending (for example unemployment benefits). Similarly, different
taxes have different elasticities to business cycle fluctuations. One may expect
capital income taxes to be more volatile than consumption taxes.
As argued in the World Economic Outlook 2010 issued by IMF, methods de-
scribed above may lead to substantial errors, identifying consolidations that
had not occurred or omitting some relevant ones. To solve this problem, the
IMF proposes an ’action-based’ approach that concentrates on actions (legisla-
tion changes implemented in order to reduce the deficit) not results (changes
in cyclically adjusted budget balance).7 Methodology similar to the one ap-
plied by the IMF was used in work of Romer and Romer (2007) in order to
identify large discretionary changes in U.S. fiscal policy. The main advantage
of action-based approach is that, in theory, it allows to select cases of fiscal
consolidations without a risk of misspecification. Consolidation is defined as a
period when the government takes actions aimed to reduce the budget deficit,
regardless of their consequences (recorded changes in the deficit). It means that
the fiscal impulses are identified ex ante, not ex post, as in the case of other
methods. However, in practice this method requires great amount of subjec-
tivity while determining the fiscal policy stance in subsequent periods as it is
rare that detailed and coherent data on the planned effects of fiscal actions and
policy-makers’ intensions behind them is reported in IMF or OECD surveys
prepared on annual basis.8 This problem is even more sever while this method
7The IMF study, firstly, points out that fiscal consolidations have contractionary effects
on output in the short run, regardless of their size, whereas in the long term contractions
through their effects on the debt level stimulate the economy. Secondly, it confirms that the
composition of the adjustment and external conditions are of importance (factors like mone-
tary policy, country default risk, performance of other countries) in mitigating contractionary
effects on GDP
8This was noted by Alberto Alesina in his response to the Economist article mentioned in
the introduction of this paper
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is applied to emerging countries that are not members of the OECD or joined
it only recently. For example, in our country sample we were not able to use
this method for most periods before the year 2000 because of the absence of ap-
propriate data. At the same time, studies quoted in the previous section show
that occurrence of non-Keynesian fiscal policy effects is more likely in countries
in transition or countries with low debt tolerance which are mainly emerging
markets. Moreover, the method proposed by the IMF implicitly assumes that
households and firms make decisions based on the government’s plans rather
than on the basis of the observed effects of the actions (like changes in the
deficit). This may be not true as governments tend to withdraw or modify their
plans along the budget year, so final effects of fiscal policy may be as important
in the process of formulating expectations by economic agents as government’s
reforms announcements. Finally, if the consolidation size is assessed only on the
basis of government estimates of fiscal reform effect we may miss some channels
important for the occurrence of non-Keynesian effect, for example - realized (not
planned) reduction in transfers to households may result in higher labor supply
and, consequently, GDP growth.
In this article we decided to restrict ourselves to three methods of fiscal im-
pulses identification: CAPB, CAPB corrected for one-offs (underlying balance)
and von Hagen method.9 We have not applied the action-based approach pro-
posed by the IMF due to problems with access to data that could produce series
of accuracy and length appropriate for econometric estimation. Nevertheless,
we perceive the IMF work as an important voice of criticism that should stim-
ulate further works on developing statistical techniques to distinguish cyclical
and discretionary movements in the fiscal policy stance.
4.2 Data
We used panel data recorded on an annual basis for the EU New Member States
(namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) in the period from 1995-2010. Rele-
vant data was obtained from a variety of sources. Fiscal data (including CAPB
estimates) and national account data were taken from the European Commis-
sion’s AMECO database. Data concerning real and nominal effective exchange
rates originate from Eurostat database, domestic credit to private sector - from
the World Bank and lastly, Consumer Price Index - from IMF’s IFS database.
Detailed description of each variable used can be found in the appendix. The
data do not cover the whole period for all countries, hence the estimated models
9Of course, there are other methods used to determine the fiscal policy stance, like the
method proposed by Blanchard (1990 b) or Stock-Flow Adjustment (SFA, described in Eu-
rostat methodology papers). While the first one is widely known, the second needs some
comments. According to this approach, while thinking about fiscal policy sustainability one
should follow not only changes in the deficit figures but also changes in the debt stock, which
are not the same. Nevertheless, factors that influence the debt stock that are not included
in the deficit are rarely structural in nature, so we would rather like to ignore them in our
calculations of deficit adjusted for business cycle impact. Because of that, we do not apply
the SFA method in our analysis
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are based on an unbalanced panel.
4.3 Specification of Equations
In order to validate theoretical possibility for the occurrence of non-Keynesian
effects we, at first, estimated the effect of changes in the government struc-
tural balance on GDP growth. By structural balance we mean general govern-
ment primary balance adjusted for the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations,
according to three different methods outlined in subsection 4.1 - growth ac-
counting proposed by von Hagen, the CAPB and the underlying fiscal balance
(that is, the CAPB adjusted for one-offs). In our regression specification we
include both current and lagged fiscal impulse. We also included lagged real
GDP growth in order to capture the conventional persistence of this variable
caused by the business cycle. We also control the effects of inflation, changes
in the levels of nominal interest rates and external conditions reflected in the
growth rate of total imports in EU27 countries. Finally, we added artificial
variable art exp distinguishing between impulses relying on tax and government
spending changes. The variable art exp is equal to the impulse variable if the
contribution of government expenditure reduction (increase) in fiscal tightening
(loosening) is greater than 50 percent and otherwise it is equal to 0. Hence, we
estimated the following equation:10
gdpit = µ+ δ1 gdpit−1 +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulseit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expit−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
φkn mit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
ρk imp eu27it−k +
k=1∑
k=0
ωk cpiit−k + αi + it (1)
where gdp is real GDP growth, impulse - fiscal impulse resulting from a change
in structural balance, art exp - artificial variable that controls for composition of
the impulse (spending versus tax based), n m - nominal money market interest
rate, imp eu27 - growth rate of total imports in EU27 countries, cpi - growth
of consumer price index; α represents a time-invariant country-specific distur-
bance (individual effect) and  is a random noise. Variables subscripts i and
t mean respectively - country number (from 1 to 10) and year (from 1 to 16).
According to the theoretical assumptions described in section two of this paper,
non-Keynesian effects in the analyzed economies should appear in output expan-
sions (contractions) when fiscal policy is tightened (loosened). This means that
in equation (1) at least one of the estimated coefficients βk should be positive
and statistically significant. However, output response may depend also on the
composition of the impulse. This effect should manifest itself by the sign (and
10We realize that subsequent models presented in this section may seem oversimplified.
However, the short time dimension of the analyzed panel prevents us from using more so-
phisticated methods such as, for example, panel VAR models or including a greater range of
explanatory variables
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significance) of γk parameters. To present the overall two-period impact of a
spending based adjustment we test linear restriction where β0+β1+γ0+γ1 = 0.
If the null hypothesis is rejected and the obtained statistic proves positive, the
result will be consistent with the theory of non-Keynesian effects.
As the next step of the analysis, we tried to identify the channels through which
non-Keynesian effects occur. Firstly, we tried to confirm the existence of the
export channel. If it really does operate, the reduction in fiscal deficit obtained
by cuts in expenditure should boost exports more than a reduction obtained
by tax increases, as described in section two. To verify this hypothesis we once
again included the variable art exp, present in the regression explaining GDP
growth. Hence, the estimated equation has the following form:
exportit = µ+ λ1 exportit−1 +
k=1∑
k=0
δk gdpit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulseit−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art expit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
φk reerit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
ρk imp eu27it−k + αi + it (2)
We added the real effective exchange rate (reer) and a set of other variables
like GDP growth or growth rate of imports in UE27 in order to capture main
determinants of export performance (variable abbreviations as in 1). If an export
channel exists, parameters of at least one of the pairs β0 and γ0 or β1 and γ1
should be positive and statistically significant. To put it in a different way,
statistic of linear restriction test for joint significance of impulse and art exp
parameters (both current and lagged) should be significantly higher than zero.
Secondly, we examined the existence of the private investment channel. In order
to do so, we estimated the following equation:
pinvit = µ+ λ1 pinvit−1 +
k=1∑
k=0
δk gdpit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulseit−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk r mit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
φk gov invit−k + αi + it (3)
where pinv stands for real growth of private investment. In this regression,
apart from controlling for GDP growth (and investment accelarator effect), we
included real interest rate and government investment growth in order to capture
the changes in the cost of capital and ’crowding-out’ effect respectively. Like
in previous regressions we look not only at parameters βk but also test their
joint significance assuming in the null hypothesis of linear restriction test that
β0 + β1 = 0. We assumed that the main channel through which non-Keynesian
effects could operate in the case of private investment is potential relaxation
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary constraints put on external finance availability.
Thus, we abstained from adding additional variables controlling for the impulse
composition.
Lastly, we explore the relation between fiscal policy changes and private con-
sumption growth. According to non-Keynesian effects theory, fiscal adjustment
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should accelerate rather than hamper consumption growth if it is lasting and
sizable. To validate this hypothesis we include a new artificial variable in the
regression - art high which takes the value of the fiscal impulse variable if the
latter exceeds the threshold of 1,5 percent of GDP in one year, or 1 percent
in two successive years, otherwise the variable is equal to zero.11 Hence, the
regression specification is as follows:
pconit = µ+ λ1 pconit−1 +
k=1∑
k=0
δk gdpit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
βk impulseit−k
+
k=1∑
k=0
γk art highit−k +
k=1∑
k=0
φk pcreditit−k + αi + it (4)
where GDP growth and growth rate of credit to the private sector as a share of
GDP (pcredit) are included as control variables. In such way, we control for the
impact of personal income fluctuations and potential liquidity constraints on
consumption growth. The non-Keynesian effects theory predicts that at least
one pair of the parameters β0 and γ0 or β1 and γ1 should be significantly higher
than 0. Once again we examine the overall two-period impact of the impulse by
testing validity of the restriction β0 + γ0 + β1 + γ1 = 0.
What is important is the fact that in three out of four equations presented above,
interest rates and exchange rates are included as control variables, despite the
fact that non-Keynesian effects are expected to operate through a fall in interest
rate and currency depreciation in response to diminishing government financing
requirements. This means that, the models presented below may underestimate
the strength of non-Keynesian effects. However, monetary variables may be
driven not only by the fiscal policy stance thus excluding these variables might
lead to omitted variables bias.
4.4 Methodological issues
Estimation of the equations described in the previous subsection may pose a
problem for several reasons. First of all, the equations are dynamic in nature
so the standard panel data estimators like fixed effects (FE) and random effects
(RE) are biased. One way to tackle the problem is to apply the Instrumental
Variables Generalized Method of Moments estimators (GMM). These estima-
tors are asymptotically consistent, yet their properties may be unsatisfactory
in case of short samples as ours. As Kiviet (1995) pointed out, it is possible to
correct the bias resulting from using the standard LSDV estimator (the least
square dummy variable, estimator that gives identical results as the FE esti-
mator) without affecting its efficiency. In our paper we apply such corrected
LSDV estimator (LSDVC) following the procedure proposed by Bun and Kiviet
(2002) and then modified for the analysis of unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005).
Secondly, the reggresors used in the equations may be exposed to endogeneity
11Similar thresholds were applied in, for example, Ciz˙kowicz and Rzon´ca (2005), Alesina
and Ardagana (2010) or the IMF (2010)
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problem. It is controlled to some extent by using fiscal impulses rather than
changes in the level of the general government deficit, howevever, it may be
insufficient to fully eliminate the endogeneity bias. Once more, the solution is
to apply the GMM estimators - one proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) -
the so-called difference estimator, or the estimator proposed in Arellano and
Bover (1995) - the so-called system estimator. Still, both estimators use lags of
endogenous variables as instruments and they exhibit severe bias when applied
to short samples. These obstacles prevented us from using the GMM estima-
tors in this research. Thirdly, the abscence of sufficient number of observations
makes it impossible to allow for heterogeneity of the estimated parameters in
our models. If the estimated parameters varied across the countries, standard
approach would be to estimate separately the model for each country with the
OLS and average the parameters obtained in such a way.12 In our case each of
country-separate regressions would be based on at most 16 observations, which
make the estimates clearly unreliable. The fourth problem that could affect
our results is a possible panel-level (or group) heterogeneity and a contempo-
raneous correlation of error terms. In the model analyzed this is equivalent
to the assumption that there is a connection between individual states in the
range of effects not included in the model. If such an assumption was true,
the model can be estimated using the OLS estimator with the panel corrected
standard errors proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). In our models we use the
Prais-Winsten transformed regression estimator for additional correction of the
first-order serial-correlation of residuals.
Taking into account all the above-mentioned restrictions, we analyzed relations
we have formulated using four types of panel data estimators: fixed effects (FE),
random effects (RE), Prais-Winsten with panel corrected standard errors (PW-
PCSE) and biased-corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVC). At the
same time, we do realize that the obtained results could be affected by some of
the abovementioned problems and that conclusions drawn on their basis should
be taken with caution.
4.5 Estimation results
According to the above presented description of equations we estimated the im-
pact of discretionary fiscal policy changes on GDP growth. Table 1 presents a
range of estimates varying by the type of estimator applied and method used to
identify structural changes in the fiscal balance.13 Regardless of the estimator,
in the case of impulses identified by the CAPB and the underlying fiscal balance,
the obtained GDP growth response to fiscal policy changes has rather Keyne-
sian flavor - parameter related to impulse variable is negative and significant.
12The Mean Group estimator was first proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995)
13There are two common features of the results presented in this subsection. Firstly, in
all of the estimated specifications, tests for the individual effects (in random and fixed effects
models) indicate that models could be estimated using the OLS. Secondly, Breusch-Pagan test
for RE indicates that estimated variance of individual effects is close to zero, which means
that the obtained estimates should be equal to the results using the OLS estimator. This
observation allows us to give up from presenting OLS estimator results
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However, the situation changes if we restrict ourselves to adjustments based on
expenditure reduction - in the case of two out of three impulse identification
methods (von Hagen’s and the underlying fiscal balance) the total two-period
impact of curtailment of government expenditure on GDP growth is positive
and statistically significant on 5 percent significance level (10 percent in the
case of the LSDVC estimator with the impulse calculated according to the von
Hagen method). Having in mind potential problems with regression estimation
and identification of the fiscal policy stance outlined in the previous subsection,
we argue that most of the attention should be drawn to the LSDVC estimates
with fiscal impulses calculated as changes in the underlying fiscal balance. The
estimated coefficients indicate that a discretionary improvement in the fiscal
balance by 1 percent of GDP caused mainly by expenditure reduction raises the
output momentum rate by about 0.50 p.p. Thus, we find the evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that non-Keynesian effects may outweigh Keynesian ones as
far as consolidations relying on government expenditure curtailment are con-
cerned.
Next, we tried to verify the channels through which non-Keynesian effects op-
erate. Firstly, we used equation (2) in order to examine the export channel.
The main result we obtained (see Table 2) does not confirm the existence of the
export channel: the coefficients on the current and lagged impulse are negative,
however, in most cases significant on a 10 percent level, but not on a 5 percent
one. Still when the impulse is identified according to the underlying balance ap-
proach, the composition of consolidation has significant impact on the growth of
exports - coefficient on art exp is significantly higher than zero, regardless of the
estimator used. The overall two-period effect of expenditure-based fiscal tight-
ening on export growth seems to support the non-Keynesian effects hypothesis
to a certain degree - statistics of linear restriction test are mainly positive and
significant on a 10 percent level, but not on a 5 percent one.
Secondly, using the empirical specification given by equation (3), we attempted
to examine the potential investment channel. The results of the estimation (see
Table 3) indicate that discretionary changes in the fiscal deficit have positive
and significant impact on private investment growth regardless of the estimator
used. The impact is the strongest when the fiscal policy stance is measured
by the underlying balance - a fiscal tightening equal to 1 percent of GDP con-
tributes to acceleration of private investment by about 1.4 percent according
to the LSDVC estimator. The estimates of current GDP growth are significant
and, in accordance with the conventional accelerator effect, act positively on
dependent variable. Other control variables remain insignificant in most cases.
Lastly, we estimated equation (4) in order to find evidence of a consumption
channel for non-Keynesian effects (Table 4). The obtained estimates indicate
that there is no straightforward and significant relation between private con-
sumption growth and discretionary fiscal policy changes. This manifests itself
in coefficients on the current impulse variable -they are negative but not signif-
icant. If the lagged impulse is concerned the situation changes a bit - in most
cases (including the most reliable LSDVC estimator) the parameter is still neg-
ative, but significant on a 10 percent level. However, we find partial support
19
for the consumption channel when only substantial consolidations are consid-
ered. The parameters concerning the lagged variable art high are positive with
significance varying across the models. The LSDVC estimator with the impulse
calculated according to the underlying balance concept gives estimates that are
significant on 10 percent level. Still, the overall two-period effect of sizable fis-
cal consolidation remains insignificant, regardless of the estimator and impulse
identification method.
To sum up, we find some evidence of non-Keynesian effects in the countries
analyzed. We confirm the results already established in the literature, that the
output response to fiscal adjustment depends on the composition of the lat-
ter. According to the results of the estimation, fiscal consolidations tend to be
accompanied by private investment acceleration. However, only consolidations
driven by government expenditure reduction prove to be expansionary, which is
an effect of their additional positive impact on export momentum, apart from
stimulation of private investment growth. We also find that in the case of siz-
able contractions, non-Keynesian effects may cancel out the Keynesian ones
when private consumption growth is analyzed. What is worth mentioning that
in most of the regressions presented above we included control variables through
which non-Keynesian effect could occur. This refers mainly to interest rate and
exchange rates variables. Excluding them may lead to results more favorable for
the non-Keynesian notion, but probably biased, as we would loose the control of
theoretically important determinants of economic performance that are driven
not only by factors central to theory of the non-Keynesian effects.
5 Conclusions
In this article we have analyzed the relation between fiscal policy and economic
performance in 10 NMS countries in the years 1995-2010. Before presenting the
relevant results, we reviewed both theoretical and empirical literature devoted to
the topic of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. We paid particular attention
to the ongoing debate on the accuracy of different methods used to separate
discretionary fiscal balance changes. The main conclusion from the analysis are
as follows:
1. Theoretical models explaining non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction
can be divided into two groups. The first group attributes the source of
non-Keynesian effects to the concerns of private agents about the govern-
ment solvency. It is argued that strong fiscal consolidation should stimu-
late private expenditure by dispelling the uncertainty about the outlook
for public debt. According to models of the second group, non- Keynesian
effects are caused by positive supply shocks, induced by fiscal impulses. In
this channel, the composition, not the size of the impulse plays a crucial
role - reducing expenditure, particularly on wages and salaries, eases wage
pressure in the whole economy, while higher taxes boost the pressure.
2. The existing empirical works indicate that, consistently with the the-
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ory, non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction are most plausible in open
economies, where external environment is favorable and consolidation is
large and based on expenditure curtailment. These results were primar-
ily obtained for developed countries but they are also confirmed when
countries in transition are considered.
3. It is possible that standard methods used to determine the fiscal stance
may be biased towards detecting non-Keynesian effects when they did not
occur (for example, by treating cyclical changes in capital tax revenues
as structural). However, the alternative ’action-based’ approach proposed
by the IMF to eliminate this bias suffers from the implementation prob-
lems and, moreover, it did not allow to analyze the full range of channels
through which non-Keynesian effect may operate. At the same time, the
CAPB based methods are continuously improved - for example by allowing
for ’one-off’ operations correction.
4. The most robust result of our econometric analysis is that composition of
the fiscal impulse is crucial for non-Keynesian effects to occur. We find
that fiscal contractions that rely on expenditure reductions are accompa-
nied by GDP and exports growth acceleration even in the short term. On
the contrary, consolidations based on tax increases seems to hamper GDP
growth in line with the Keynesian theory.
5. Substantial evidence has been found for the existence of investment chan-
nel - the reaction of private investment growth to fiscal policy changes is
quite strong and takes direction consistent with the non-Keynesian effects
theory. According to the estimator we find the most reliable (LSDVC),
fiscal tightening equal to 1 percent of GDP contributes to an acceleration
of private investment of about 1.4 percent.
6. We have not found convincing evidence of the existence of consumption
channel, although there are certain signs that private consumption reac-
tion to fiscal tightening may be nonlinear - as far as only sizable con-
tractions are concerned Keynesian effects are cancelled out by the non-
Keynesian ones.
7. We test robustness of the results by comparing the relevant regression
coefficients when different methods to separate discretionary changes in
fiscal policy are applied. We find that most of the results remain quali-
tatively unchanged regardless of the impulse identification method used.
What is important is the fact that non-Keynesian effects are the most
visible when the concept of underlying fiscal balance is used - the method
we find the most reliable.
The results presented above should be treated with caution because of the esti-
mation problems typical for panel data models, notably in the case of the limited
number of available observations. Nevertheless, they constitute further, even if
only partial, support for the already quoted Jean-Claude Trichet statement that
’the idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect’.
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7 Data Appendix
Variables presented in order as they appear in equations presented in section
’Econometric analysis’:
• gdp - annual growth of real Gross Domestic Product
Source: AMECO database
• impulse - annual change of primary general government balance (as a share
of GDP) adjusted for cyclical factors. Three different ways of adjustment
were applied - method proposed by von Hagen (2002), CAPB and under-
lying fiscal balance (CAPB corrected for one-offs).Positive number of the
variable means narrowing of the deficit, while negative - its deterioration
Source: CAPB estimates - AMECO database; other methods - own cal-
culation based on AMECO data
• art exp - artifical variable that takes the value of the impulse variable(as
defined above) if the government expenditure change accounts for at least
50% of the impulse, otherwise it is equal to 0.
Source:Own calculation based on AMECO database
• n m - nominal short-term (3-month) interest rate
Source: AMECO database
• imp eu27 - annual growth of the total of imports of goods and services in
27 EU countries at 2000 constant prices
Source: AMECO database
• cpi - annual growth of Consumer Price Index
Source: International Finance Statistics database of IMF
• export - annual growth rate of exports of goods and services at 2000
constant prices
Source: AMECO database
• reer - real effective exchange rate deflated by nominal unit labour costs
(total economy) and consumer prices (CPI/HICP).
Source: Eurostat database
• pinv - annual growth rate of private investment at 2000 constant prices
Source: AMECO database
• r m - real short-term (3-month) interest rate
Source: AMECO database
• gov inv - annual growth rate of general government investment at 2000
constant prices
Source: AMECO database
• pcon - annual growth of private consumption at 2000 constant prices
Source: AMECO database
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• art high - artificial variable that takes the value of the impulse if its size
exceeds 1,5% GDP in one year, or 1% in two successive years, otherwise
the art high variable is equal to 0
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO database
• pcredit - annual change of credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank database
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8 Tables
Table 1. The Effects of Fiscal Deficit Impulses on GDP
Growth
RE FE PCSE LSDVC
UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB
gdp 1 0.467*** 0.493*** 0.442*** 0.544*** 0.573*** 0.510*** 0.446*** 0.526*** 0.438*** 0.581*** 0.617*** 0.442***
[5.27] [5.78] [4.78] [6.49] [7.54] [6.06] [3.78] [4.69] [3.47] [7.35] [8.21] [4.70]
art exp 1.481*** 0.408 1.152*** 1.245*** 0.318 1.073*** 1.481*** 0.379 1.137*** 1.476*** 0.399 1.136*
[3.95] [1.17] [3.50] [3.59] [0.97] [3.55] [4.84] [1.33] [4.19] [3.63] [1.03] [1.79]
art exp 1 0.752* -0.00664 0.189 0.446 -0.113 0.0698 0.709** -0.16 0.196 0.635** -0.0485 0.184
[1.90] [-0.02] [0.56] [1.22] [-0.34] [0.23] [2.33] [-0.58] [0.73] [2.20] [-0.13] [0.30]
impulse -0.940*** 0.139 -0.959*** -0.836*** 0.244 -0.881*** -0.975*** 0.182 -0.961*** -0.924*** 0.173 -0.945*
[-3.32] [0.42] [-3.40] [-3.10] [0.77] [-3.33] [-4.60] [0.71] [-4.25] [-3.27] [0.48] [-1.87]
impulse 1 -0.0331 0.106 -0.132 0.0881 0.146 -0.0454 -0.106 0.207 -0.18 0.0688 0.109 -0.128
[-0.11] [0.32] [-0.46] [0.32] [0.47] [-0.17] [-0.48] [0.79] [-0.79] [0.26] [0.32] [-0.27]
n m 0.125 -0.174*** 0.0971 0.108 -0.166*** 0.0836 0.128 -0.195*** 0.0913 0.13 -0.182*** 0.0972
[1.33] [-3.14] [0.98] [1.20] [-3.06] [0.91] [1.39] [-3.28] [1.00] [1.41] [-2.79] [0.56]
n m 1 -0.0558 0.0746 -0.0449 -0.0142 0.104* -0.0185 -0.0311 0.135** -0.0194 -0.0585 0.0928 -0.0474
[-0.85] [1.22] [-0.65] [-0.23] [1.84] [-0.29] [-0.50] [2.19] [-0.33] [-0.90] [1.42] [-0.39]
imp eu27 0.526*** 0.493*** 0.548*** 0.533*** 0.486*** 0.549*** 0.518*** 0.475*** 0.541*** 0.530*** 0.494*** 0.548***
[11.11] [9.32] [11.05] [11.30] [9.41] [11.35] [9.08] [7.66] [9.02] [10.89] [8.80] [5.92]
imp eu27 1 -0.054 -0.0307 -0.0448 -0.108 -0.0828 -0.0887 -0.054 -0.0469 -0.0549 -0.123** -0.101 -0.0446
[-0.77] [-0.43] [-0.61] [-1.61] [-1.27] [-1.31] [-0.63] [-0.59] [-0.64] [-2.15] [-1.45] [-0.51]
cpi -0.158*** -0.00301 -0.135*** -0.142*** -0.00476 -0.126*** -0.151*** -0.00673* -0.129*** -0.160*** -0.00277 -0.136*
[-3.64] [-0.61] [-3.07] [-3.47] [-1.14] [-3.09] [-3.61] [-1.70] [-3.04] [-3.95] [-0.61] [-1.72]
cpi 1 -0.0386 -0.00125 -0.0162 -0.0268 -0.00137 -0.00651 -0.0327 -0.00375 -0.0123 -0.0288 -0.0008 -0.0167
[-1.02] [-0.27] [-0.43] [-0.77] [-0.31] [-0.19] [-0.96] [-0.94] [-0.34] [-0.91] [-0.17] [-0.28]
Constant 1.100** 0.562 0.613 0.456 0.169 0.215 0.88 0.285 0.426 NA NA NA
[2.04] [1.01] [1.12] [0.95] [0.33] [0.44] [1.39] [0.41] [0.65]
Observations 123 134 123 123 134 123 123 134 123 123 134 123
R-squared 0.73 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.73 0.68 0.70 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects (p-value) NA NA NA 0.3617 0.7751 0.4467 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (p-value) 0.5613 0.2236 0.2474 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sum of fiscal variables coefficients (current and lagged)a 0.944 0.595 0.216 1.259 0.647 0.250 1.110 0.607 0.192 1.255 0.632 0.269
Test for joint significance of of fiscal variables coef. (p-value)b 0.007 0.004 0.381 0.001 0.004 0.348 0.001 0.002 0.404 0 0.01 0.339
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of GDP. Explanatory variables defini-
tions are reported in the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in the subsequent
regressions, while the second row describes methods used to calculate fiscal impulses. Fiscal impulses
used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying Balance (col-
umn UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (column
CAPB).Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance at 1 (***),
5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
a Sum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1, art exp, art exp 1
b Test of linear restriction that sum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1, art exp,
art exp 1 equals zero
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Table 2. The Export Channel - the effects of fiscal impulses
on export growth
RE FE PCSE LSDVC
UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB
export 1 -0.215** -0.189** -0.168* -0.126 -0.127 -0.104 -0.108 -0.0438 -0.0627 -0.163* -0.137 -0.111
[-2.37] [-2.22] [-1.86] [-1.41] [-1.51] [-1.17] [-0.69] [-0.31] [-0.42] [-1.71] [-1.61] [-1.15]
gdp 0.774*** 0.767*** 0.689*** 0.714*** 0.684*** 0.642*** 0.689*** 0.653*** 0.622*** 0.767*** 0.761*** 0.680***
[3.83] [3.64] [3.32] [3.49] [3.26] [3.10] [3.28] [2.93] [2.70] [4.09] [3.77] [3.50]
gdp 1 -0.109 -0.0422 -0.182 -0.256 -0.136 -0.293 -0.205 -0.0726 -0.277 -0.139 -0.07 -0.215
[-0.48] [-0.20] [-0.80] [-1.13] [-0.65] [-1.33] [-0.94] [-0.29] [-1.19] [-0.57] [-0.34] [-0.86]
impulse -1.137* -0.422 -1.08 -0.938 -0.452 -1.008 -1.241* -1.112 -1.283* -1.150* -0.438 -1.1
[-1.69] [-0.51] [-1.59] [-1.44] [-0.56] [-1.57] [-1.78] [-1.43] [-1.87] [-1.72] [-0.55] [-1.56]
impulse 1 -1.327* -1.254 -1.232* -1.008 -1.297 -1.104* -1.136 -1.516* -1.289* -1.294* -1.26 -1.198*
[-1.96] [-1.51] [-1.82] [-1.52] [-1.60] [-1.70] [-1.57] [-1.88] [-1.83] [-1.93] [-1.52] [-1.66]
art exp 2.719*** 0.438 1.249 2.203*** 0.578 1.204 2.668*** 1.283 1.440* 2.724*** 0.472 1.285
[3.11] [0.49] [1.56] [2.70] [0.68] [1.61] [3.08] [1.62] [1.93] [2.98] [0.53] [1.48]
art exp 1 1.378 1.342 1.008 0.716 1.464* 0.848 0.921 1.626** 0.932 1.258 1.328 0.955
[1.51] [1.52] [1.27] [0.83] [1.73] [1.15] [0.98] [1.97] [1.20] [1.45] [1.59] [1.12]
imp eu27 0.675*** 0.711*** 0.767*** 0.719*** 0.759*** 0.800*** 0.752*** 0.840*** 0.832*** 0.678*** 0.712*** 0.769***
[4.10] [4.10] [4.55] [4.30] [4.39] [4.74] [4.77] [5.31] [5.12] [3.76] [5.21] [4.09]
imp eu27 1 0.185 0.135 0.136 0.179 0.152 0.147 0.158 0.0332 0.119 0.152 0.102 0.0987
[1.11] [0.76] [0.79] [1.08] [0.88] [0.88] [0.89] [0.18] [0.66] [0.99] [0.65] [0.63]
reer -0.0252 -0.0885 -0.0571 -0.00299 -0.0675 -0.028 -0.015 -0.0431 -0.0286 -0.0289 -0.0905 -0.0596
[-0.31] [-1.10] [-0.69] [-0.04] [-0.87] [-0.35] [-0.24] [-0.62] [-0.44] [-0.38] [-0.99] [-0.77]
reer 1 0.0751 0.121 0.0876 0.0509 0.12 0.0732 0.0486 0.0946 0.0634 0.0781 0.123 0.0906
[0.83] [1.38] [0.96] [0.57] [1.39] [0.82] [0.70] [1.21] [0.88] [0.88] [1.28] [1.05]
Constant -1.918 -0.611 0.175 -1.915 -2.962 -1.653 -0.919 -3.998 -1.061 NA NA NA
[-0.36] [-0.11] [0.03] [-0.41] [-0.57] [-0.35] [-0.27] [-0.95] [-0.30]
Observations 128 140 128 128 140 128 128 140 128 128 140 128
R-squared 0.60 0.50 0.57 0.55 0.45 0.53 0.66 0.55 0.63 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects (p-value) NA NA NA 0.119 0.238 0.296 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (p-value) 0.447 0.762 0.861 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sum of fiscal variables coefficients (current and lagged)a 0.973 0.293 -0.060 1.632 0.105 -0.056 1.213 0.282 -0.200 1.539 0.102 -0.057
Test for joint significance of of fiscal variables coef. (p-value)b 0.217 0.564 0.916 0.057 0.842 0.925 0.101 0.519 0.686 0.076 0.861 0.925
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of goods and services export. Explana-
tory variables definitions are reported in the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators
used in the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used to calculate fiscal
impulses. Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches:
Underlying Balance (column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted
Primary Balance (column CAPB).Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote esti-
mates significance at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
a Sum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1, art exp, art exp 1
b Test of linear restriction that sum of coefficients related to impulse, impulse 1, art exp, art exp 1
equals zero
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Table 3. The Investment Channel - the effects of fiscal
impulses on private investment growth
RE FE PCSE LSDVC
UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB
pinv 1 0.0331 0.119 0.0712 0.133 0.185** 0.144 0.144 0.251* 0.191 0.109 0.201** 0.153
[0.35] [1.28] [0.74] [1.47] [2.06] [1.53] [1.04] [1.92] [1.38] [1.15] [2.45] [1.59]
gdp 2.356*** 2.217*** 2.469*** 2.239*** 2.143*** 2.336*** 2.260*** 2.183*** 2.371*** 2.356*** 2.211*** 2.468***
[11.71] [9.82] [12.48] [11.39] [9.68] [12.00] [10.86] [9.61] [11.49] [11.89] [9.52] [11.99]
gdp 1 0.656** 0.3 0.463 0.353 0.106 0.199 0.367 -0.0518 0.117 0.457* 0.117 0.259
[2.05] [1.07] [1.47] [1.15] [0.39] [0.65] [0.88] [-0.14] [0.28] [1.68] [0.44] [0.92]
impulse 1.356** 0.685 0.782* 1.410** 0.672 0.747* 1.479*** 0.697* 0.840** 1.359** 0.721** 0.818*
[2.37] [1.55] [1.79] [2.49] [1.53] [1.71] [3.31] [1.88] [2.25] [2.41] [2.01] [1.94]
impulse 1 1.030* 0.217 0.229 0.885 0.152 0.165 1.071** 0.156 0.267 0.935 0.162 0.19
[1.74] [0.60] [0.55] [1.55] [0.44] [0.40] [2.30] [0.52] [0.71] [1.59] [0.47] [0.45]
r m -0.174 -0.00105 -0.196* -0.12 -0.00249 -0.154 -0.172* -0.00441 -0.184* -0.174 -0.00121 -0.197
[-1.57] [-0.09] [-1.74] [-1.14] [-0.23] [-1.44] [-1.88] [-0.37] [-1.87] [-1.32] [-0.11] [-1.53]
r m 1 -0.147 -0.0261** -0.177 -0.0272** -0.0955 -0.0613 -0.0336** -0.0801 -0.131 -0.0279** -0.159*
[-1.36] [-2.13] [-1.61] [-2.33] [-0.93] [-0.72] [-2.56] [-0.86] [-1.41] [-2.55] [-1.70]
gov inv -0.0508 -0.0815** -0.0644 -0.0463 -0.0710* -0.0539 -0.0635 -0.0899** -0.0764 -0.0491 -0.0791* -0.0619*
[-1.18] [-1.98] [-1.50] [-1.11] [-1.76] [-1.26] [-1.30] [-2.03] [-1.59] [-1.39] [-1.75] [-1.78]
gov inv 1 -0.0328 0.00375 -0.0626 -0.00646 0.00824 -0.0387 -0.00198 0.0117 -0.0249 -0.0279 0.00519 -0.0551
[-0.76] [0.28] [-1.48] [-0.15] [0.62] [-0.93] [-0.04] [1.30] [-0.53] [-0.60] [0.35] [-1.24]
Constant -6.333*** -4.828*** -6.080*** -5.730*** -4.397*** -5.301*** -5.958*** -4.212*** -5.564*** NA NA NA
[-5.20] [-3.84] [-4.95] [-4.80] [-3.61] [-4.38] [-4.92] [-3.39] [-4.54]
Observations 123 134 123 124 134 123 123 134 123 123 134 123
R-squared 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.73 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects (p-value) NA NA NA 0.282 0.437 0.405 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (p-value) 0.8939 0.692 0.995 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sum of current and lagged impulse variables coefficients 2.330 0.823 0.912 2.386 0.902 1.011 2.549 0.853 1.108 2.293 0.883 1.008
Test for joint significance of of impulse variables coef. (p-value)a 0.007 0.174 0.174 0.008 0.149 0.136 0 0.101 0.072 0.009 0.124 0.151
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of private investment. Explanatory
variables definitions are reported in the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in
the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used to calculate fiscal impulses.
Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying
Balance (column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Bal-
ance (column CAPB).Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance
at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
a Test of linear restriction that sum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1 equals
zero
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Table 4. The Consumption Channel - the effects of fiscal
impulses on private consumption growth
RE FE PCSE LSDVC
UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB UB H CAPB
pcon 1 0.153 0.152 0.154 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.177 0.187 0.19 0.257*** 0.262*** 0.264***
[1.55] [1.52] [1.53] [3.02] [2.99] [2.99] [1.29] [1.34] [1.36] [2.84] [2.98] [2.95]
gdp 0.874*** 0.859*** 0.863*** 0.863*** 0.849*** 0.850*** 0.868*** 0.866*** 0.854*** 0.867*** 0.853*** 0.857***
[10.38] [8.70] [9.98] [10.36] [8.88] [9.97] [8.89] [8.02] [8.35] [9.33] [7.42] [9.00]
gdp 1 -0.04 0.0876 0.0143 -0.213* -0.108 -0.165 -0.124 -0.0233 -0.0867 -0.13 0.00205 -0.0742
[-0.31] [0.65] [0.11] [-1.75] [-0.84] [-1.35] [-0.84] [-0.15] [-0.57] [-0.93] [0.02] [-0.61]
pcredit 0.183*** 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.157*** 0.142** 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.187*** 0.176*** 0.177***
[3.25] [3.05] [3.04] [2.85] [2.54] [2.60] [2.95] [2.58] [2.68] [3.21] [3.01] [3.01]
pcredit 1 0.00979 0.017 0.0154 -0.0407 -0.0348 -0.0328 -0.0265 -0.0201 -0.0169 -0.00291 0.00413 0.00252
[0.17] [0.29] [0.26] [-0.72] [-0.60] [-0.56] [-0.48] [-0.36] [-0.30] [-0.06] [0.08] [0.05]
impulse -0.015 -0.0159 0.00865 -0.0789 -0.0494 -0.0713 -0.0925 -0.108 -0.128 -0.028 -0.0173 0.0115
[-0.09] [-0.10] [0.05] [-0.49] [-0.31] [-0.43] [-0.58] [-0.78] [-0.91] [-0.16] [-0.08] [0.05]
impulse 1 -0.358** -0.331* -0.226 -0.406** -0.283 -0.249 -0.425*** -0.319* -0.277 -0.367* -0.340* -0.225
[-2.17] [-1.73] [-1.16] [-2.44] [-1.46] [-1.27] [-2.78] [-1.71] [-1.51] [-1.75] [-1.83] [-1.23]
art high -0.0596 -0.285 -0.242 0.0406 -0.156 -0.0926 0.07 -0.0813 -0.00795 -0.0536 -0.29 -0.248
[-0.31] [-0.97] [-0.81] [0.21] [-0.54] [-0.32] [0.49] [-0.32] [-0.03] [-0.27] [-0.95] [-0.79]
art high 1 0.318 0.626** 0.513 0.393** 0.598** 0.587* 0.429*** 0.688*** 0.664** 0.327* 0.641** 0.517
[1.62] [2.11] [1.65] [2.06] [2.11] [1.95] [2.74] [2.60] [2.42] [1.82] [2.09] [1.64]
Constant -0.515 -1.109 -0.758 -0.129 -0.56 -0.374 -0.198 -0.75 -0.478
[-0.73] [-1.38] [-1.04] [-0.22] [-0.87] [-0.61] [-0.31] [-1.14] [-0.74] NA NA NA
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
R-squared 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA
Wald test for joint significance of fixed effects (p-value) NA NA NA 0.107 0.068 0.097 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects (p-value) 0.649 0.501 0.633 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sum of fiscal variables coefficients (current and lagged)a -0.051 0.110 0.174 -0.115 -0.006 0.054 -0.018 0.180 0.251 -0.122 -0.007 0.054
Test for joint significance of of fiscal variables coef. (p-value) b 0.864 0.697 0.527 0.719 0.983 0.855 0.956 0.474 0.303 0.712 0.981 0.844
Note. The dependent variable is the annual real growth rate of private consumption. Explanatory
variables definitions are reported in the Appendix. The first row of the table lists estimators used in
the subsequent regressions, while the second row describes methods used to calculate fiscal impulses.
Fiscal impulses used in regressions are obtained in line with three different approaches: Underlying
Balance (column UB), von Hagen decomposition (column H) and Cyclically Adjusted Primary Bal-
ance (column CAPB).Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Stars denote estimates significance
at 1 (***), 5 (**) and 10 (*) percent levels.
aSum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1, art high, art high 1
bTest of linear restriction that sum of coefficients related to variables impulse, impulse 1, art high,
art high 1 equals zero
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